Maestro of Identity Politics by| Anand Teltumbde

Maestro of Identity Politics

Vol - XLIX No. 40, October 04, 2014 |

 Anand Teltumbde 

• Book Reviews
• Kanshiram: Leader of the Dalits by Badri Narayan (New Delhi: Penguin Books), 2014; pp 263, Rs 499.

  Anand Teltumbde (tanandraj@gmail.com) is a writer and civil rights activist with the Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights, Mumbai.

  Now that Kanshi Ram's tryst with resolving the caste tangle by using the master key of political power is ending with the electoral debacles of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh (UP), one can dispassionately look at the phenomenon he was. As such, there could not have been a better time for Badri Narayan's ably crafted biography.

  Whatever little has been written on Kanshi Ram has been heavily affected by the electoral successes of the BSP. A man who came from nowhere; who forsook all ties to shape the future with only grit and determination as his resources; and who raised an army of the most unlikely people – government dalit employees – to catalyse a political movement that captured power in the most unlikely state, can only be described as a phenomenon. He made the ideological B R Ambedkar stand on his head, and still claimed to pursue his mission; he made a virtue of the vice of opportunism that plagued the post-Ambedkar dalit leadership, and still succeeded. Whichever way history pronounces its verdict on him, it cannot ignore the fact that he was an extraordinary strategist, an organiser of people, and focused on what he wanted to carry out. Whether he contributed to the empowerment or emancipation of dalits, as he and many others apparently believed, is difficult to answer.

  A Strange By-product

  The trajectory of the dalit movement under Ambedkar was conditioned by the expediencies of the politics of his time. Although firmly moored to universalist values, it appeared tactical, often contradictory and informed by pure pragmatism. Those after Ambedkar failed to comprehend its intricacies, and constructed "Ambedkars" and "Ambedkarisms" of their convenience, splintering the movement into numerous factions. The Republican Party of India (RPI), which came into being in 1957 as a political party of the non-Congress, non-Communist opposition, proved to be just a new label for the Scheduled Castes Federation, but even this could not hold itself together. It split, and its members joined the Congress, the party Ambedkar fought all his life and termed a burning house. The deserters, however, remained Ambedkarites. Later, the Congress consciously carried out a co-option strategy through Yashwantrao Chavan, reducing dalit politics to the art of brokering dalit interests.

  With the weakening of the dalit organisations, their cultural assertion of converting to Buddhism in Maharashtra was met with brute reaction from other castes, resulting in rising atrocities against them. These shocking developments apparently did not affect Kanshi Ram, who was working in Pune as a research assistant in the Explosives Research and Development Laboratory. He was awakened by a small but symbolic incident that took place at his workplace in which a class IV employee was fired for protesting against the scrapping of holidays on Buddha Jayanti and Ambedkar Jayanti. Kanshi Ram successfully followed up the case and ensured his reinstatement. This episode impelled him into social activism, from which he was never to turn back. He tried to work for the RPI, but was soon disillusioned with it. Curiously, an alternative in the form of Dalit Panthers had emerged in those days with a radical interpretation of Ambedkar, but it did not attract Kanshi Ram. It was indeed amazing that being geographically not very far from the epicentre of the Panther movement, he spoke about the RPI, but never the Dalit Panthers.

  Strategist Extraordinaire

  The strategist in Kanshi Ram studied the situation and identified an opportunity to organise educated government employees belonging to the scheduled castes (SCs), scheduled tribes (STs), Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and minorities. These people comprised not only the brain bank, but also the money bank of these communities. SC and ST employees who secured government/public sector jobs through reservations were discriminated against by upper-caste administrators. These people needed organisational protection. The OBCs and minorities, though not eligible for reservations, also felt neglected. Organising these people would mean representing about 85% of the population against the remaining 15% comprising the dwija (twice-born) castes. This would be a winning constituency in any future contest for political power. The strategy Kanshi Ram formulated is worth teaching in management schools. In 1971, the Backward (SC, ST, OBC) and Minority Communities Employees' Federation, with the acronym Bamcef, was born. Badri Narayan provides a graphic description of how hard Kanshi Ram worked, with great devotion and sacrifice, to realise his goal.

  Although Bamcef was confined to government employees who were constrained by service rules from taking part in political activities, its emergence as a strong nationwide organisation played a role in mobilising many youth to enter politics. More importantly, it provided funds for Kanshi Ram's political activities. After nurturing it for a decade, Kanshi Ram took a qualitative leap by stepping into the political arena, launching the Dalit Soshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti (DS4) on 6 December 1981. It unnerved some people in Bamcef who naively believed that they should continue working as a social club. Kanshi Ram, however, went ahead, using the DS4 platform to contest the Haryana assembly poll a year later. The manner in which he organised this "intermediate" outfit (it was divided into 10 wings, each with a different role and responsibility); used bicycle rallies as the campaign mode; came up with creative and catchy slogans in a language provocative to the upper castes (tilak taraju aur talwar, inko maro jute char; Brahmins, Baniyas and Kshatriyas, kick them out); and set himself up as a model for young activists is detailed in the book. In just three years, Kanshi Ram accomplished a level of mobilisation that would enable him to transform the DS4 into the BSP. When it happened in 1984, it was a logical next step that surprised nobody.

  The electoral strategy Kanshi Ram followed was a master stroke. He used election after election to consolidate his constituency, with its core in the Jatav/Chamars (untouchable lower castes), who constituted 57% of the total dalit population, which, in turn, was 21% of the total population. With the addition of the next populous caste, Pasi, 16% of the dalit population, this constituency potentially had nearly 15% of the votes, sufficient to attract unaffiliated dalits, Muslims, and others who were not particularly enamoured with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Congress, or Samajwadi Party (SP). When this strategy began paying off, reflected in a consistent rise in the BSP's vote share, Kanshi Ram could negotiate with various political parties from a position of strength. In the mid-term assembly poll in 1993, which came right after the demolition in Ayodhya rendering the BJP a political untouchable, he struck a seat-sharing alliance with the SP. After the election, the BSP joined a coalition government with Mulayam Singh Yadav as the chief minister. It was no mean achievement to reach where Kanshi Ram had in less than a decade. It, however, proved short-lived. In 1995, he withdrew support to the Mulayam Singh government and made Mayawati, his protégé, the chief minister with support from the BJP, a party of Manuwadis, to the utter dismay of all. However, it was a dream come true for dalits. This helped the BSP to consolidate and expand its constituency, which resulted in its vote share rising to a peak of 30.46% in the 2007 assembly elections.

  Kanshi Ram and Mayawati knew that the bonhomie with the BJP would not last long, and they planned to exploit it to the hilt. The government went on a spending spree on building memorials of dalit icons, and naming various institutions after saints from the dalit pantheon. Ambedkar statues were installed all over the state, dalits were placed in a number of top positions, and festivals to honour dalit and backward class heroes were introduced. As expected, after 136 days, the BJP withdrew its support to the government and president's rule was imposed. In the election held in 1996, the BSP failed to secure a majority despite support from the Congress. The strategic dexterity of Kanshi Ram saw him again strike a deal with the BJP to make Mayawati the chief minister. She feverishly continued renaming institutions and unveiling monuments, distributing largesse to her dalit supporters. The aggressiveness of the BSP made the dalits feel empowered, but at the same time rendered them vulnerable, which, in turn, helped the BSP stay in power. They voted zealously for the BSP in election after election, even after Mayawati migrated to sarvajan, embracing brahmins on the eve of the 2007 election. While this strategy paid her rich dividends, it exacted a disproportionate political price – the importance of dalits declined in the BSP's scheme of things.

  Post-Kanshi Ram BSP

  Kanshi Ram died on 9 October 2006 after a prolonged illness that began in 1995. Realising his health was failing, he bequeathed the BSP mantle on Mayawati in 2001. She proved to be a true disciple in matters of strategy and political dexterity, but lacked Kanshi Ram's austerity, sacrifice, dedication, and foresight. The pomp and personal aggrandisement she indulged in gradually alienated her from the people. Many castes and communities that thronged behind her, giving her an absolute majority in 2007, were soon disillusioned. It showed in the 2009 general elections when the BSP's vote share fell from 30.46% in 2007 to 27.42%, a decrease of 3.02%. In three years, it dropped by 1.52% to 25.90% in the 2012 assembly elections. In 2014, it came down to 19.60%, a sharp drop of 6.30%. This clearly shows that other castes and minorities are fast deserting the BSP and that even dalits may soon follow suit. The BSP's national vote share declined from 6.17% in 2009 to 4.1% in 2014. This does not mean the BSP is finished. In our first-past-the-post system, where caste-community equations and money-muscle power play a decisive role, it will still carry on. But surely it is past its zenith, and has wandered too faraway from its pretence of participating in emancipatory politics for dalits.

  It is interesting to speculate what Kanshi Ram would have done now. One expects he would have somehow stemmed the decline and reconfigured political equations to stay longer in power. Maybe, if he was around, he would have catapulted the BSP to power at the centre and given it a new shine. That incidentally would have been his ultimate goal, where he would have received the master key to all the problems dalits suffer. It certainly goes to his credit that the goalpost was within sight. What if Mayawati became prime minister? Would discrimination against dalits stop? Would atrocities against them come to an end? Would they have basic security? The inevitable answer to these questions is a resounding no. Mayawati has been the chief minister of UP four times, and these questions can be asked in relation to the state's dalits. The fact is that their condition, on most developmental parameters, is worse than that of dalits in other states. Statues and memorials intoxicate people with identity pride, which the ruling classes always relish. It is beneficial to them that the dalits stay drunk, oblivious to reality. That is what took place in UP when Mayawati was the chief minister. If she had thought of altering the structure of the society in any manner, she would have realised what it took. Blissfully, both she and her mentor did not speak the language of radical transformation.

  Limitation of Identity Politics

  One might note that what annoyed Kanshi Ram initially was basically an emotional issue of celebrating jayantis, not the spate of caste atrocities in Maharashtra that provoked others to become Panthers. His diagnosis was symptomatic of this provocation. While what he did makes great strategic sense, it makes equally poor sense if seen in terms of comprehending the core problem. Kanshi Ram saw that if dalits had political power, issues like demanding holidays on Ambedkar or Buddha jayanti or naming universities after Ambedkar would not arise. This diagnosis informed his entire mission. He derived support from a dictum of Ambedkar that political power was the gurukilli (master key) to all problems. True, but what constitutes political power and for whom? If Ambedkar had seen politics as Kanshi Ram did, he would not have warned the nation that equality in politics but inequality in economics and society would be an explosive contradiction. He explicitly said,

  Politics is not the be-all and end-all of the nation's life. We must study the Indian Problem in all its aspects, political, social, religious, and economic and fight with own accords for the solution of the downtrodden.

  What Kanshi Ram excelled in was taking identity politics to new highs. All played caste politics, but he beat them hollow. Identity politics can massage your ego, make you feel good, but cannot feed your hunger, or liberate you from bondage. It can give you statues and memorials, but not what those icons lived for. Kanshi Ram emphasised the humiliation the middle classes faced, but not the exploitation and oppression of the masses. He never agitated on any real issue, and harped on an abstraction of political power. The BSP's accomplishments are painted by protagonists as an empowerment of dalits, a silent revolution, without realising that it was all confined to the realm of notions. It does not reflect reality of any kind. It verily spells the limitation of identity politics.

  Kanshi Ram's conception of bahujan glosses over the material disparities between various castes and communities. There is a class contradiction between rich shudra farmers and dalit farm labourers. Caste atrocities are manifestations of these contradictions, and the perpetrators are invariably people belonging to the shudra castes, assumed to be a constituent of bahujan. There is plenty of evidence, right from Jyotirao Phule's attempt to bring shudras and ati-shudras (dalits) together, to indicate that the much-desired unity of the working castes has never materialised. In the wake of the Mandal reservations, dalits supported reservations, thinking that it would bind them together. There is not the slightest evidence that it has happened anywhere. On the contrary, it can be easily seen, if statistics on atrocities are taken as a proxy, that the contradiction between haves and have-nots has only grown. Even SCs and STs, which are taken as a conjoint category, have not been homogenised in the last six decades. The castes demanding reservations, such as Gujars in Rajasthan in 2008 and Dhangars in Maharashtra now want them as STs, not SCs.

  Castes are inherently divisive, they can never integrate. It could be said of Kanshi Ram's bahujan strategy that it basically rested on the Jatav/Chamars. It never was duplicated anywhere despite the monumental efforts he invested. Lastly, the success of Kanshi Ram or the BSP in UP could be explained by a unique combination of factors that obtained there than by the idea of a bahujan, which has not worked anywhere else and is appearing to be ephemeral even in the state. It follows therefore that the conception of a bahujan on the basis of caste identities leads only to self-deception. The only viable way to conceive of a bahujan is by transcending castes, and bringing people together on the basis of class.

  Readable and Valuable

  Badri Narayan is a capable writer, and discusses some of these questions beyond taking a third-person view of critics. But he appears to have intentionally confined himself to a biographer's role. One must respect his decision, and probably thank him for providing the pertinent facts to ignite a discussion among readers. It is an important contribution, and Kanshi Ram surely deserves it.

  There are some minor errors in the book, which may be corrected in the next edition. A few I casually noted: the People's Education Society was established by Ambedkar in July 1944 in Bombay and not in Poona (p 30). The RPI was formed in 1957, not in 1956 (p 30). The public declaration of its formation was made at the first anniversary of the Dhammachakra Parivartana Day in Nagpur on 3 October 1957, which is taken as its establishment year, although the decision to form it was taken at a two-day meeting in Ahmednagar, chaired by Rajabhau Khobragade, on 31 December 1956 and 1 January 1957. The RPI-Congress alliance in Maharashtra did not have anything to do with "the rise of parochial right-wing politics in Maharashtra (Shiv Sena was established in 1966)" (p 31). The people behind the Dalit Panthers were Namdeo Dhasal and J V Pawar, not Daya Pawar (p 32). Ambedkar returned to India after higher studies in the US and UK in economics and law, not the US alone (p 82). These errors, however, in no way diminish the readability or the value of the book.