BAMCEF UNIFICATION CONFERENCE 7

Published on 10 Mar 2013 ALL INDIA BAMCEF UNIFICATION CONFERENCE HELD AT Dr.B. R. AMBEDKAR BHAVAN,DADAR,MUMBAI ON 2ND AND 3RD MARCH 2013. Mr.PALASH BISWAS (JOURNALIST -KOLKATA) DELIVERING HER SPEECH. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLL-n6MrcoM http://youtu.be/oLL-n6MrcoM

Monday, April 29, 2013

British documents show that during last days of WW II, Viceroy Wavell did not want Netaji brought to India as a prisoner.



---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Samirbaran Das <samirbarandas465@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Apr 29, 2013 at 4:22 PM
Subject: Re:



British documents show that during last days of WW II, Viceroy Wavell did not want Netaji brought to India as a prisoner. British preferred for dealing with him 'on the spot'. Bose was stimulating a post-war upsurge against British. He thought that India's partition was inevitable if British were allowed to "transfer power". Bose's aim in 1945 was not just to escape the British pursuit. He had foreknowledge of Japan's decision to capitulate. In the spring of 1945, he wanted to lead a challenge against the forces of Allies. He wanted to court death in battle. He thought that, after Aung San of Burma switched over to British side at the last moment, the INA needed to set an example of patriotic bravery. He was dissuaded from this course because two divisions of the INA were still intact and he thought of a new role for this patriotic force in the postwar situation. Unlike other leaders of the Japan-occupied Southeast Asian countries, he, at one stage, thought of staying with INA troops in Singapore to await the arrival of the Mountbatten-led British Indian occupation force. This course was abandoned on August 14, 1945, on the advice of members of AH govt. On Aug 14, 1945, some information was brought to him from Thailand. This information led him to abandon the plan that INA should await the capture of Singapore by the British. There is no record of the information that caused the AH govt to ask Netaji to fly to Tokyo for final consultations with Jap govt. Netaji had been forewarned of British preference for dealing with him "on the spot"? Did he fear that he would not be taken to India as a prisoner? He knew of the existence of the Allies' spies in INA and behind the Japanese lines. As the war drew to a close, important people changed sides. They acted on the Allies' directives. Even in Japan there were people who wanted to please the victors. They were ready to pay price new masters demanded. The British Foreign Office had ordered the assassination of Netaji in 1941, just after he made his "grand escape". But his decision to change route and reach Germany via Russia had scuttled their plan. Eunan O'Halpin of Trinity College, Dublin, made this claim at Netaji Research Bureau. O'Halpin said the British Special Operation Executive (SOE) (formed in 1940 to carry out sabotage activities) informed its representatives in Istanbul and Cairo that Bose was thought to be travelling from Afghanistan to Germany via Iran, Iraq and Turkey. They were asked to arrange his assassination. O'Halpin handed over relevant documents to Krishna Bose.  On June 13, 1941, the British SOE confirmed to Istanbul that the assassination order still stood. After Japan surrendered again scope came for British to utilize Japan against Netaji. So, British must have utilized this new opportunity and assassinated him in secret. 



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